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1.1  Introduction 
In most developing and transitional economies, exchange rate issues have 
tended to dominate macroeconomic policy discussions during the past few 
years. In particular, attention has focused on two broad problems: first, defin- 
ing, measuring, detecting, and correcting situations of real exchange rate mis- 
alignment and overvaluation and, second, understanding the relationship be- 
tween nominal exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Issues related to 
real exchange rate misalignment have been central, for example, in debates 
that preceded the devaluation of African currencies participating in the Com- 
munautC Financfre  Africaine franc zone in 1994, in post mortems of the Mexi- 
can crisis of December 1994, and in recent analyses of the Argentine stabiliza- 
tion program of  199  1. 
Regarding the relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic sta- 
bility, four specific questions have attracted the attention of analysts and poli- 
cymakers: (a) Why have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, ex- 
change rate regimes, while others have opted for more flexible systems? @) Do 
fixed exchange rate regimes impose an effective constraint on monetary behav- 
ior and thus result in lower inflation rates over the long run? (c) Are exchange- 
rate-based stabilization programs superior to money-based stabilization pro- 
grams? (d) How should exchange-rate-based stabilization programs actually 
be designed? 
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The first two issues deal with the long run, while the third is related to the 
short-run, transitional consequences of stabilization programs.’  All four issues, 
however, have important implications for a country’s macroeconomic perfor- 
mance and growth. Moreover, most of these questions are intimately related to 
political economy and institutional considerations. 
This paper deals with the first question from a political economy perspec- 
tive. I ask why some countries (e.g., Argentina) have fixed exchange rate re- 
gimes while other countries (e.g., Chile) opt for significantly more flexible 
systems. The more general question is why, approximately 25 years after the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, 84 countries (out of  167 reported 
in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics)  continue to peg their currencies 
to a major currency or a currency composite (these are data for December 
1994).  The theoretical discussion, presented in section 1.2, emphasizes the role 
of credibility, politics, and institutions. In the empirical analysis (section 1.3) 
I use a large cross-country panel data set for developing and middle-income 
countries to analyze empirically the determinants of the choice of regime. 
1.2  The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regimes 
In this section I develop a simple theoretical framework for analyzing the 
selection of  an exchange rate regime. The analysis relies on the existence of 
a trade-off between “credibility” and “flexibility” and assumes that a pegged 
exchange rate system allows the authorities to resolve, at least partially, the 
time inconsistency problem. I assume that policymakers minimize a loss func- 
tion defined over a monetary variable (inflation) and a real variable (say, unem- 
ployment). In order to simplify the discussion I initially assume that the two 
alternative regimes are a flexible exchange rate system and a permanently fixed 
exchange rate system. I then extend the analysis to the case where the two 
options are a flexible regime and a pegged-but-adjustable regime. In this case 
I assume that the abandonment of the pegged exchange rate entails important 
political costs. 
1.2.1  Fixed or Flexible? A Simple Framework 
Assume, for simplicity, that the monetary authorities must choose between 
two nominal exchange rate regimes: (permanently) fixed or flexible. Assume 
that the authorities take into account the expected value of a loss function un- 
der the two alternative systems. Consider the case where the loss function is 
quadratic and depends on inflation (T)  squared and on squared deviations of 
unemployment (u) from a target value (u*). This type of  approach has been 
adopted, with some variants, by  a number of authors (see, e.g., Persson and 
Tabellini 1990; Devarajan and Rodrik 1992; Frankel 1995).  The model is given 
by  equations (1) through (5): 
1. See Sachs (1996). On the selection of exchange rate regimes, see Corden (1994),  Edison and 
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(1) 
(2) 
L  = E[rz  +  F(U - u*)’],  F > 0; 
u =  U’ -  IT - 0)  + +(x - x’),  E(x) = x’,  V(X)  = a’; 
(3)  uh  < u’; 
(4)  = E(IT)  + ~E(x  -  x’); 
(5) 
Equation (1) is the loss function. Equation (2) states that the observed rate of 
unemployment (u)  will be below the natural rate (u’)  if inflation exceeds wage 
increases (IT -  w > 0) and if external shocks (x) are below their mean (x’). 
Variable x  can be interpreted as a composite of terms of trade and world interest 
rate shocks. It is assumed to have a variance equal to u*. Equation (3) estab- 
lishes that the target rate of  unemployment u*  is below the natural rate u’. 
Equation (4) implies that agents are rational in setting wage increases (a  <  0), 
and equation (5) defines inflation as a weighted average of the rate of devalua- 
tion (d)  and the rate of wage increases (0).  Under fixed rates d is by definition 
equal to zero, while under flexible rates the authorities set d according to an 
optimal devaluation rule. A limitation of this approach is that it assumes fixed 
rates are unchangeable. The case of  a pegged-but-adjustable regime can be 
handled assuming that the fixed rule has escape clauses (see Flood and Isard 
1989). 
The model’s solution depends on the sequence in which decisions are made. 
Assume that workers determine w before they observe x, d, or IT. The govern- 
ment, on the other hand, sets its exchange rate policy after both w and x are 
observed. The government’s objective is to set its exchange rate policy so as to 
minimize the value of the loss function (1). The solution in the case of fixed 
exchange rates is 
(64  IT  = 0, 
(6b) 
These results assume that the fixed exchange rate system allows the govern- 
ment to solve its credibility problem by  providing a precommitment tech- 
nology. 
The solution is slightly more complicated under flexible exchange rates. In 
this case the authorities have to determine the optimal exchange rate adjust- 
ment rule. The final solution for d, IT, and u under flexible exchange rates is 
given by 
(74 
IT  = pd  + (1 - p)w. 
u  = u’  + *(x  -  x’). 
d  =  -A@’(]  + 8’p)8p(u*  - u’) - p.€@*(x  -  x’)], 
(7b) 
(7c) 
,flex  -  - =fixed  -  B~(u* -  u’) + p’FO*A(x  -  x’), 
p3  $4~  - x’), 
ufle~ -  -  Ufined  - 
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which under most plausible conditions is greater than zero. Equation (7b) es- 
tablishes that due to the unemployment objective, inflation under flexible rates 
will tend to exceed its equilibrium level under fixed rates. That is, if the unem- 
ployment objective is important in the loss function, the authorities will be 
tempted to “overinflate.” On the other hand, unemployment under flexible rates 
will be higher (lower) than under fixed rates if  there are negative (positive) 
external shocks. 
In selecting the exchange rate regime, the authorities will compare the ex- 
pected value of the loss function under both regimes: 
(8) 
If K > 0, a fixed exchange rate regime will be adopted. It is easy to see that K 
is given by 
K  = E(Lflex -  Lfixed). 
(9)  K  = E[(IT””)’ + p.((~”~~  -  u*)‘  - p.(uflXed  - u”)’]. 
This expression is intuitively appealing. It states that the selection of the ex- 
change rate regime will depend on the square of inflation under flexible rates- 
remember that expected inflation is zero in the fixed rate regime-and  on the 
difference  between the squared deviations of unemployment from their respec- 
tive targets. After some manipulation equation (9) can be rewritten as 
(10)  K  = (ep)yu* -  d)2 - yu2, 
where y is a positive function of  A, p, p.,  8, and $. For K  to be positive, and 
thus for fixed rates to be preferred, the country’s “employment ambition”- 
measured by  u*  -  u’-has  to be “large enough.” More specifically, it has to 
exceed the variance of  the external shocks. On the other hand, if  u2  is high 
enough, K can be negative, indicating that flexible rates are preferred. This 
would allow the authorities to reduce the deviation from their unemployment 
target. An important question in the empirical evaluation of this (and related) 
models is how to measure the degree of “ambition” of the authorities’ unem- 
ployment target, u* -  u’.  I take up this issue in section 1.3. 
1.2.2  Flexible versus Pegged-but-Adjustable Exchange Rate Regimes 
The preceding analysis assumed that under a fixed regime the nominal ex- 
change rate would never be altered. This is, of course, a major simplification. 
In reality, under fixed exchange rates, governments always have the choice of 
abandoning the peg. This possibility can be captured formally by  assuming 
that the authorities follow a rule with some kind of  escape clause. In  other 
words, the nominal exchange rate will be maintained at its original level under 
certain circumstances. However, if these circumstances change markedly, the 
peg will be abandoned. This means that at any moment in time there is a posi- 
tive probability that the pegged rate will be altered. This type of  arrangement 13  The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
formed the basis of the original Bretton Woods system that ruled the interna- 
tional monetary system from 1948 to 1973.  According to the original Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement, a country could alter its 
peg if it was facing a “fundamental disequilibrium.”  In this subsection I sketch 
the analytics of this case. 
Assume that ex ante a country can choose between two possible regimes: 
flexible nominal rates (F) or pegged but adjustable rates (P). Also consider a 
two-period economy, where under a pegged regime there is a positive probabil- 
ity that the peg will be abandoned at the end of the first (or beginning of the 
second) period. The probability of abandoning the peg is denoted by q,  and the 
discount factor by p. As in the preceding analysis, assume that the authorities 
have a distaste for both inflation and for deviations of unemployment from a 
target level. 
Assume further that the authorities will incur a political cost equal to C if 
the peg is indeed abandoned. This assumption captures the stylized fact, first 
noted by  Cooper (1971), that stepwise devaluations have usually resulted in 
serious political upheavals and, in many cases, in the fall of the government. 
Cooper reports that more than two-thirds of  the finance ministers that engi- 
neered the devaluations lost their jobs within two months of the devaluation 
(see also Edwards 1994). The magnitude of this cost will, in turn, depend on 
the political and institutional characteristics of the country, including the de- 
gree of political instability. In politically unstable countries a major economic 
disturbance, such as the abandonment of  a parity that the authorities have 
promised to defend, will tend to have major political consequences. For ex- 
ample, this can explain why the vast majority of  stepwise devaluations take 
place during the early years of an administration, when its degree of political 
popularity is higher. The degree of political instability will also affect the gov- 
ernment’s discount factor. In more unstable countries the authorities will tend 
to be more impatient, discounting the future more heavily. This means that, 
denoting the degree of political instability by  p,  we can write 
(1 1)  C =  C(p),  with C’  > 0; 
(12)  p = p(p),  withp’  < 0. 
In this two-period economy, the loss function under flexible rates is (where 
the notation is consistent with that used in the previous section) 
(13)  L”=” =  an“)*  +  P(UF -  + P(Hn“>;+, + P[(UF),+l  -  U*I2), 
where 6 is a parameter that captures the degree of  distaste for inflation. The 
loss function under a pegged rate regime is 
(14)  Lpggd  = s(.rrp)z  + F(UP - .*Y  + PI(1 - q)(H*);+] 
+ F[(U‘),+,  -  U*l?  + q(s(.rp);+,  + P“(U”),+, -  u*I’)  + qC1, 14  Sebastian Edwards 
where the superscript D refers to the value of a specific variable in the second 
period under the devaluation scenario. If the escape clause is exercised and the 
peg abandoned, we assume that the country moves into a flexible regime. That 
is, once the peg is abandoned, inflation and unemployment in the second pe- 
riod will be determined as under a flexible system. The rate of  inflation will 
be higher under the pegged-but-adjustable regime than under the (unrealistic) 
“forever” fixed system considered in section 1.2.1. This is because under a 
pegged regime the public’s expected rate of inflation (in period 2) will explic- 
itly take into account the probability that the peg will be abandoned: 
anP),+,  = q(fl),+,  + (1 - q)(vp)l+l 
(see Edwards 1996). 
In order to simplify the discussion and concentrate on the selection of the 
exchange rate regime, I do not specify explicitly the process governing the 
decision to use the escape clause. As in equation (8) in the preceding section, 
the regime decision rule will be based on an ex ante comparison between both 
loss functions: 
(15)  K  = E(L””” -  LFgg*). 
If  K > 0, then the pegged-but-adjustable regime is preferred.  Some simple 
manipulation yields 
(16)  K  = S(.rr’>’ + P[(KF)2 -  (Kp)21  + P(1 - s>s(~F>:+, 
+ P(1 -  q)P[(KF):*I  - (Kp):+ll  - 4PC, 
where (K”)’  = (u“ -  u*)~  and (K’)~  = (Up -  u*)~.  From the analysis in the 
previous section it follows that (K~)~  -  (K’)’  < 0 and that  (KF):+I  -  (K‘)~,, 
<  0. From equation (16) it is possible to derive a number of hypotheses regard- 
ing the likelihood of  a country’s choosing a pegged-but-adjustable exchange 
rate regime. A higher rate of inflation under flexible rates (in either period) 
will increase the likelihood of a pegged regime’s being chosen. Moreover, with 
other things given, a higher weight for inflation in the loss function-that  is, a 
higher &-will also increase the probability of  choosing a pegged exchange 
rate. On the other hand, an increase in unemployment volatility under pegged 
rates, generated by a higher variance in the foreign shock-a  higher u2,  from 
the previous section-will  increase the likelihood that a flexible system will 
be selected. A greater distaste for unemployment deviations-that  is, a higher 
k-will  reduce the likelihood of selecting a pegged rate. Likewise, a higher 
cost of abandoning the peg-a  higher C-will  reduce the ex ante probability 
of selecting a pegged rate. Interestingly enough, a higher probability of aban- 
doning the peg-a  higher q-will  have an ambiguous effect on the ex ante 
likelihood of choosing a pegged regime. This follows from the expression 
(17)  K, =  -PY(fl);+l  - PP[(KF):+l  -  (Kp):+,l  - PC. 15  The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
Notice that the presence of political costs of abandoning the peg (C)  increases 
the likelihood that this expression will be negative, making it more likely that 
a flexible regime will be selected. 
An important question relates to the relationship between political instabil- 
ity and the selection of  exchange rate regime. In principle there will be two 
offsetting forces. First, a higher degree of political instability will increase the 
cost of  abandoning the peg-recall  equation (1  1)-and  thus will reduce the 
ex ante probability that a pegged regime will be chosen. Second, a higher de- 
gree of instability will increase the authorities’ discount rate-equation  (12)- 
reducing the importance of “the future” in their decision-making process. For- 
mally, 
While the first term is negative, the second can be either positive or negative, 
because the sign of  Kp is indeterminate. This means that the way  in which 
instability will affect the selection of an exchange rate system is an empirical 
question. I tackle this issue in the following section, where I present the results 
of a number of probit regressions on panel data for 49 developing and middle- 
income countries during 1980-92. 
1.3  Empirical Results 
In this section I use a cross-country, unbalanced panel data set for 49 devel- 
oping and middle-income countries during  1980-92  to analyze why  some 
countries have adopted pegged exchange rate regimes while others have opted 
for more flexible systems; see the appendix for a list of the countries included 
in the analysis. I estimate a number of probit equations to investigate whether, 
when controlling for other factors, a country’s political and economic structure, 
including its degree of political instability, helps explain the selection of  an 
exchange rate regime. Two classes of independent variables were used in the 
analysis: the first  attempts to capture long-term structural characteristics- 
both political and economic-of  these countries, which are assumed to change 
very slowly over time. In the empirical analysis these variables are defined as 
averages for the decade prior to the one included in the analysis. The second 
class of independent variables tries to capture, for each country, the evolution 
of some key macroeconomic time series. 
Probit equations of the following type were estimated: 
where subindexes i and t refer to country i in year t;  peg is an exchange rate 
regime index defined below; and p,  X,  and + are parameter vectors. P repre- 
sents variables specifying national political and economic characteristics. In 
order to avoid simultaneity problems these variables were defined, in most 
cases, as averages for the previous decade, 1970-80  (see the discussion below 16  Sebastian Edwards 
for details). Q and R are variables (economic and structural) for which panel 
data are available; while the Qs are timed at period t, the Rs are lagged one 
(or more) periods. This is done mostly to reduce the pitfalls of  simultaneity 
problems. 
1.3.1  Data 
The empirical analysis poses some difficult data challenges. Chief among 
them are (a) classifying the broad variety of exchange rate systems observed 
in the real world into two broad categories, pegged and flexible, (b) measuring 
political instability, and (c) defining measures of the authorities’ incentives to 
“tie their own hands.” 
Dejning Exchange Rate Regimes 
cording to their exchange rate systems in three broad groups: 
1. Countries whose currencies are pegged either to a single currency or to 
a currency composite. 
2.  Countries whose exchange rate systems have limited flexibility “in terms 
of a single currency or group of currencies.” This group includes a rather small 
number of countries that have adopted narrow bands, including those in the Eu- 
ropean Exchange Rate Mechanism. In June 1991, for example, only 11 coun- 
tries were listed in this group. 
3. Countries with “more flexible” exchange rate systems. This group in- 
cludes countries where the exchange rate is adjusted frequently according to a 
set of indicators, countries that float independently, and countries with “other 
managed floating” regimes. 
In the empirical analysis presented in this paper, a country is classified ac- 
cording to its exchange rate regime in a binary fashion as “pegged” or “flexi- 
ble.”  A difficulty with this approach, however, is that it is not entirely clear 
how the middle group-that  is, nations that according to the IMF have “limited 
flexibility’’-should  be classified. In order to deal with this issue I have used 
two alternative classifications.  The first considers as having a pegged exchange 
rate system only those countries classified by ZFS  as such. Thus a variable peg1 
that takes a value of one for those countries and zero for countries with “limited 
flexibility” and “more flexible” regimes was defined. The second classification 
considers as having a pegged regime those countries classified as such by IFS, 
plus those with flexibility limited “in terms of  a single currency or group of 
currencies.”  Variable peg2, then, takes a value of one for “pegged” and “limited 
flexibility” countries and zero for those nations with “more flexible” regimes. 
Measuring Political Instability 
Most empirically based political economy studies have used rather crude 
measures of political instability, including the number of politically motivated 
The IMF’s International  Financial Statistics  (IFS) classifies countries ac- 17  The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
assassinations and  attacks (Barro  1991). Other  studies have  used  the fre- 
quency-either  actual or estimated-of  government change as a measure of 
political turnover and instability (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). A 
limitation of this type of measure, however, is that it treats every change in the 
head of state as an indication of political instability, without inquiring whether 
the new leadership belongs to the same party as the departing leader or to the 
opposing party. In that sense, for example, the replacement of a prime minister 
by  another from the same party is considered to have the same meaning as a 
change in the ruling party (Cukierman 1992). 
In this paper I use a new index of political instability (POLTRAN) that fo- 
cuses on instances when there has been a transfer of power from a party or 
group in office to a party of  group formerly in the opposition, between 1972 
and 1980; the merits of this type of index were first discussed in Edwards and 
Tabellini (1994). This index measures the instability of the political system by 
capturing changes in the political leadership from the governing party  (or 
group, in the case of a nondemocratic regime) to an opposition party. In con- 
structing this index, a transfer of power is defined as a situation where there is 
a break in the governing political party’s  (or dictator’s) control of  executive 
power. More specifically,  under a presidential system a transfer of power would 
occur if a new government headed by a party previously in the opposition takes 
over the executive. Under a parliamentarian regime a transfer of power is re- 
corded when a new government headed by a party previously in the opposition 
takes over, or when  there are major changes in the coalition so as to force 
the leading party into the opposition. However, when the governing coalition 
remains basically unaltered, even if the new prime minister belongs to a party 
different from that of the outgoing prime minister, a transfer of power is not 
recorded. Finally, in the case of  single-party systems, dictatorships, or mon- 
archies, a transfer of power only takes place if there is a forced change of the 
head of  state. The appointment of  a successor by an outgoing dictator (as in 
Brazil during the 1970s) is not recorded as a transfer of power. This variable 
has a single value for each country, corresponding to the period 1971-80.  By 
concentrating on the period immediately preceding the period used in the 
probit analysis, potential endogeneity problems are reduced. 
In addition to the POLTRAN index of political instability, three indicators 
were used as proxies for the extent of weakness of the government in office. 
The first refers to whether the party or coalition of  parties in  office has an 
absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament. In any given year 
this indicator, called MAJ, takes a value of zero if  the party (coalition) does 
not have a majority, a value of one if it has a majority, and a value of two if 
the system is a dictatorship. A higher value of MAJ, then, reflects a stronger 
government. In the cross-country regression the average of MAJ over 1971-80 
was used. 
The second indicator of political weakness is the number of political parties 
in the governing coalition (NPC). This index takes a value of zero for monar- 18  Sebastian Edwards 
chical or dictatorial systems and the number of parties participating in a ruling 
coalition under a democratic regime (e.g., if there is a single-party government, 
NPC will take the value of  one). It is expected that the higher the number of 
parties in that coalition, the higher the probability of conflict of interest across 
ministries and thus the higher the reliance on the inflation tax. 
The third indicator of government weakness is whether the government is a 
coalition government or a single-party government (COAL). This index takes 
a value of zero for dictatorships, a value of one for single-party governments, 
and a value of two for coalition governments. As with MAJ, NPC and COAL 
were defined as averages for 197  1-80. 
Other Data 
According to the model presented in section 1.2, in addition to the political 
factors discussed above, other variables that capture structural characteristics 
of  the economy are important in the process of  selecting an  exchange rate 
system. 
External shocks. Two alternative indexes were used to measure the extent of 
external shock variability. A coefficient of variation of real export growth for 
1970-82  (CVEX) was constructed with raw  data obtained from ZFS. A co- 
efficient of  variation  of  real  bilateral exchange rate  changes for  1970-82 
(EXVAR) was constructed from data obtained from ZFS. The use of these vari- 
ables in the regression analysis presents a potential endogeneity problem. In 
order to minimize this danger in the probit reported below, lagged values (for 
1970-82)  of  these indexes were used. It is expected that the coefficients of 
these variables in the probit regressions will be negative, indicating that, as 
reflected in equation (lo), countries with more volatile external sectors will 
tend to select more flexible regimes. 
In principle, the actual importance of  external shocks should also depend 
on the degree of  openness of  the economy-more  open countries are more 
“vulnerable” to external disturbances. In order to consider this effect I added 
an interactive term (VAR  OPEN) between external variability and the degree 
of openness. The latter w& defined as the ratio of imports plus exports to GNP 
and was constructed from data obtained from IFS. This variable was defined 
as the average for I97 1-80. 
Degree of  “ambition  ” of the real target. A cornerstone of the model developed 
above-and  of most Barro-Gordon types of model-is  the idea that countries 
with very “ambitious” real objectives will have an incentive to “tie their own 
hands” in order to solve their credibility problems. That is, with other things 
given, they will have a greater incentive to select pegged exchange rate sys- 
tems. It is not easy, however, to measure empirically this degree of “ambition.” 
In particular, only a handful of middle-income and developing countries have 
reliable data on unemployment. For this reason I have used deviations of aver- 19  The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
age real rates of growth of GDP from the group’s average (for 1970-80)  as a 
proxy for the countries’ incentives to tie their own hands. In using this variable 
I assume that, with other things given, countries with historically low rates of 
growth will be more tempted to “overinflate” as a way  to accelerate growth, 
even in the short run. If  this is the case, low-growth countries will have  an 
incentive to tie their own hands as a way to avoid falling into this temptation. 
It is expected that the coefficient of GROWTH will be negative in the probit 
regressions. Naturally, the use of growth as a regressor raises the possibility of 
endogeneity. It is indeed possible that the exchange rate regime will, per se, 
affect economic performance, including growth. In order to avoid this problem 
I use lagged averages (by one decade) of growth rates in the estimation of the 
probit model (19). To the extent that this variable tries to capture the historical 
and structural incentives faced by a country to tie its authorities’ hands, the use 
of lagged averages is, indeed, appropriate. 
Probability of abandoning the peg (or ability to maintain it).  As discussed in 
the preceding section, a higher probability of abandoning the peg-a  higher 
q-can,  in principle, affect the likelihood of selecting a pegged rate either 
positively or negatively. Since it is not possible to observe q directly, three 
variables that capture the probability of having a devaluation were considered 
in the empirical analysis: LOGINF is the (logarithm of the) historical rate of 
inflation. A country with a history of rapid inflation will tend to have a greater 
propensity to devalue. This variable is defined as the average for  1970-80. 
RESMONEY  is  the yearly  lagged ratio  of  international reserves to  high- 
powered money. Higher reserves reduce, with other things given, the probabil- 
ity of abandoning the peg. This variable was defined, for each country and each 
year,  as the one-year lagged ratio of  central bank reserves to monetary base. 
CREGRO is the rate of growth of domestic credit. A country with a higher rate 
of growth of domestic liquidity will have a lower ability to sustain the peg. This 
variable was constructed from data obtained from the IMF and was defined as 
a five-year moving average. Notice that according to equation (17), in spite of 
the theoretical ambiguity of  the effect of  a higher q on the selection of  ex- 
change regime, in a country with a high political cost of devaluing, a higher q 
will reduce the likelihood that a pegged regime will be adopted. 
In addition to the variables of political instability, external shocks, and prob- 
ability of devaluing, the logarithm of per capita income (PCGDP) measured in 
1989 dollars was included in the analysis. This variable was taken from the 
World Bank‘s  World Development Report. More advanced countries tend to 
have  a  greater degree of  intolerance for inflation. Also, it has  often been 
claimed that less advanced countries do not have the institutional and adminis- 
trative ability to implement a flexible exchange rate regime. On both counts, 
the coefficient of PCGDP should be positive.* 
2. See Aghevli, Khan, and  Montiel(l991). For a critical view, see Collins (1994). 20  Sebastian Edwards 
1.3.2  Results 
Table 1.1  contains the main results from the probit analysis for both the peg1 
and peg2 measures of  exchange rate regime. Overall these results are very 
satisfactory and provide broad support for the model developed in the preced- 
ing section. Surprisingly, perhaps, there are few differences in the estimates 
obtained when the alternative definitions of dependent variables were used. 
The estimates obtained strongly suggest that the structural degree of politi- 
cal instability plays an important role in  the selection of  exchange rate re- 
gime-more  unstable countries have, with other things given, a lower proba- 
bility  of  selecting a pegged  exchange rate  system. The consistent negative 
coefficient of  this  variable indicates that empirically the direct effect of  a 
higher political cost of devaluing offsets the effect via a higher discount rate 
on the authorities’ decision-making process. Two  indexes of  the degree of 
weakness of the political system (NPC and COAL) are not significant; MAJ, 
on the other hand, is marginally positive, suggesting that a stronger govern- 
ment will have a greater tendency to select a pegged system. The intuition here 
is quite simple: a stronger government will be in a better position to withstand 
the political costs of a (possible) currency crisis and thus will be more willing 
to accept them. 
The coefficients associated with the (lagged) indexes of external volatility- 
EXVAR  and  CVEX-are  also  negative,  as  expected,  and  in  the  case  of 
EXVAR significantly so. What is particularly interesting is that the coefficients 
of the interactive term between external variability and openness (VAR-OPEN) 
are positive, and significantly so in four of the five regressions. This suggests- 
somewhat puzzlingly-that  as countries become more open, the importance 
of external disturbances in the selection of exchange rate regime declines. 
The estimated coefficients of the variables that capture the ability to main- 
tain the peg have the expected signs and are also significant at conventional 
levels. The coefficient of lagged inflation is significantly negative, suggesting 
that countries with histories of inflation will have a lower probability of main- 
taining a peg and will thus tend to favor the adoption of more flexible systems. 
Along similar lines, the coefficients of lagged credit creation are also negative. 
The lagged coefficient of the ratio of central bank international reserves to base 
money (RESMONEY) is positive in all regressions, indicating that countries 
with lower holdings of international reserves will have a lower probability of 
adopting a pegged exchange rate regime. There is, however, a potential endo- 
geneity problem: it is possible that a country that has decided to adopt a flex- 
ible rate regime will “need” a lower stock of  reserves. The use of  one-year 
lagged values of the reserves ratio reduces, however, the extent of this problem. 
The estimated coefficient of the historical rate of deviations of GDP growth 
is significantly negative indicating that, with other things given, countries with 
lower growth rates than the average will tend to prefer more rigid exchange 
rate regimes. To the extent that historical growth deviations are a good proxy 
for the “temptation to inflate,” this result can be interpreted as providing evi- 21  The Choice of  Exchange Rate Regime 
Table 1.1  Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes: Probit Regression Results 
for Developing Countries 
Peg 1  Peg 2 




































0.897  2.177 
(0.8 18)  (2.391) 
-2.514  -2.099 
(-4.856)  (-4.220) 
-0.393  -0.150 
(- 1.616)  (-0.650) 
0.569  0.138 
(0.972)  (0.271) 
1.171  0.737 





0.049  0.004 
(2.104)  (0,129) 
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(-1.017)  (-2.000) 
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(-5.833)  (-8.884) 
0.099  0.239 
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Note: Dependent variables are peg 1 and peg 2. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
dence in favor of the “tying their own hands” hypothesis. Countries with poorer 
performance-measured,  in this case, by the historical rate of growth devia- 
tions-will  have a greater incentive to renege on their low inflation promises 
and thus will benefit from adopting more rigid exchange rate systems. In order 
to analyze the robustness of these results I used the yearly difference between 
the rate of  unemployment and its long-term historical average (1970-90)  as 
an alternative measure of  the temptation to inflate. Within the context of the 
credibility view it would be expected that the estimated coefficient of this vari- 
able will be positive. A limitation of  this measure, however, is that very few 
countries have  data on unemployment. For this reason, the results obtained 
from these estimates should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, the coefficient of log of per capita income is significantly positive, 
indicating that contrary to basic intuition, more advanced countries will tend 22  Sebastian Edwards 
to adopt pegged exchange rate regimes. These results, in fact, contrast with 
those obtained in Edwards (1996) for a group of countries that included the 
advanced nations. The results reported in table 1.1 are in part explained by the 
fact that the poorer countries in the sample suffered from significant external 
crises during the period under analysis and had no alternative but to adopt more 
flexible exchange rate regimes. 
1.4  Conclusions 
This paper has dealt with the issue of  exchange rate regime selection. In 
particular, I ask: why do some countries select a flexible exchange rate regime 
while others choose a pegged regime? I argue that the answer to this question 
is largely related to the political structure of the country in question. In this 
paper I develop a formal political economy model to analyze this issue. The 
model assumes that a fixed exchange rate regime is more credible than a flex- 
ible regime. However, if the pegged regime is abandoned-that  is, if  the au- 
thorities decide (or are forced) to devalue-the  authorities suffer a significant 
political cost. The empirical results reported here indicate that for a sample of 
developing and middle-income countries, countries with more unstable politi- 
cal regimes will tend to select more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
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Comment  Anne 0. Krueger 
In this paper, Sebastian Edwards considers an important question: what deter- 
mines what exchange rate regime governments choose? His paper is positive 
rather than normative, as he posits a trade-off for governments between infla- 
tion and unemployment. In his (Barro-Gordon) framework, when countries 
have high credibility as to their macroeconomic policies, they can afford to 
choose a flexible exchange rate regime; on the other hand, if credibility is lim- 
ited, the inflation costs of a flexible exchange rate regime will be much higher. 
On the basis of the model he develops, he tests the determinants of exchange 
rate regimes for 49 countries, finding that political instability, the probability 
of abandoning pegged rates, and variables reflecting the importance attached 
to unemployment and growth targets are the most significant determinants of 
the choice of exchange rate regime. 
I have four comments regarding the paper. The first is a political economy 
question: is the choice of exchange rate regime a “rational choice” or the con- 
sequence of a learning experience? In the 1950s and 1960s, after Milton Fried- 
man wrote his classic paper, much of the rejection of the idea of flexible ex- 
change rates was based on emotional grounds: defense of national pride, belief 
in the sanctity of the gold standard, and so on. These same ideas permeated 
thinking in many developing countries: in Turkey, at the beginning of indepen- 
dent economic policy in 193  1, one of the first measures was a law requiring the 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. The national currency was, especially in 
newly independent countries, a symbol of national sovereignty, and its fixity 
had considerable emotional appeal, whatever the realities of the trade-off be- 
tween inflation and unemployment may have been. It should also be recalled 
that early development thought stressed the irrelevance of monetary incentives: 
primary commodity exports were thought by many to be in highly inelastic 
demand as exemplified by their exogeneity in the Chenery-Strout (1966) two- 
gap model. While there were some dissenters even in early days, the thinlung 
continued, especially among policymakers, for a long time. 
A second question relates to the assumption of a trade-off. Here, I have 
several misgivings. In the model, when an exchange rate is fixed there is zero 
inflation and unemployment costs can be higher than under a flexible exchange 
rate regime, where unemployment can be lower because of inflation. In reality, 
most of the developing countries that have chosen fixed exchange rates have 
not altered their domestic monetary and fiscal policies sufficiently to insure 
against inflation-how  else could we have the specter of Ghana in 1984 with 
a black market premium on the exchange rate of over 900 percent? Indeed, in 
most countries where nominal anchor exchange rate policies have been cho- 
Anne 0.  Krueger is the Herald L. and Caroline L. Etch  Professor of Economics, senior fellow 
of  the Hoover Institution, and director of  the Center for Research on Economic Development 
and Policy Reform at Stanford University, and a research associate of  the National Bureau of 
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sen-even  when the nominal anchor was a rate of exchange rate adjustment 
less than the domestic rate of inflation-the  continuing inflationary process 
has undermined the nominal anchor regime. 
Perhaps even more fundamental, fiscal deficits in developing countries are 
seldom incurred because of Keynesian-type considerations. Instead, they are 
largely the outcome of governments’ inability to enforce fiscal discipline be- 
cause of political weakness. Pressures to spend in order to gain political sup- 
port and resistances to raising revenues are simply too strong in those circum- 
stances. 
Finally, many policymakers in developing countries are now rejecting infla- 
tion because it hurts growth. Certainly, in countries such as Argentina and 
Chile, policymakers do not view inflation as being consistent with more em- 
ployment and growth; on the contrary, one reason for their commitment to 
achieving a stable price level has been their belief that inflation harms the real 
economy. To the extent that that belief is pervasive, the basis of the model is 
undermined: believers in the inefficacy of  inflation for achieving real goals 
would believe there is a positive relationship between low or zero inflation and 
the real variables they seek, and not a trade-off. 
Yet a third consideration has to do with the growth-rate-exchange-rate link- 
age. When high rates of inflation have been prevalent and policymakers have 
nonetheless adhered to a fixed exchange rate, there is an a priori basis to be- 
lieve that low growth will result. One wonders how much of Edwards’s results 
are picking up the low-growth-poor-policy relationship, rather than trade-offs 
between objectives on the part of rational decision makers. 
Finally, I have misgivings about the use of similar time periods for all coun- 
tries. After all, countries did alter their exchange and payments regimes at dif- 
ferent times, and the use of common time periods obscures that fact. The Ko- 
rean real appreciation of the latter half of the 1970s,  for example, is seen by all 
analysts as having been a significant policy mistake; yet Edwards’s choice of 
time periods would take that to have been the underlying exchange rate policy. 
If, instead, one picked “stable policy periods,” such as Ghana pre- and post- 
1984, Turkey pre- and post-1980, and Chile pre- and post-1985 (or 1975?),  the 
results might be significantly different. It would be interesting to see how the 
results would turn out if Edwards tested, within each country, for the periods 
when there were changes in policy regimes and then used the periods so deline- 
ated as his units of observation. Certainly the exchange rate regime would gen- 
erally be far clearer than it is when the same chronological time periods are 
used for all countries independent of changes in their policy regimes. 
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COIlUIlent  Andrew K. Rose 
Sebastian Edwards’s paper deals with an important question that remains at the 
heart of open economy macroeconomics, namely: what determines the choice 
of exchange rate regime? His paper provides a rigorous theoretical framework, 
in which he derives the choice as an optimal response to the magnitude and 
sources of  different shocks striking the economy. He does this in a familiar 
Barro-Gordon-style  setting that includes the government’s preferences over 
inflation and unemployment. He sensibly differentiates between two types of 
fixed exchange rate regimes: an adjustable peg and a permanent fix (which is 
really more akin to a currency union). 
Edwards also takes the extra step of going to the data. Using a panel of  12 
years of annual data for 49 developing and middle-income countries, Edwards 
estimates a probit model using both political and economic regressors to ex- 
plain actual exchange rate choices. His most striking finding is that political 
stability is associated with fixed exchange rates. He also shows that growth is 
associated with flexible exchange rates. But he finds a number of other sensible 
(if more straightforward) results: lower real exchange rate variability, lower in- 
flation, greater reserves, and capital controls are also associated with fixed ex- 
change rates. All in all, this is clearly interesting and potentially important work. 
I view this paper more as an intriguing taste of what is to come than as the 
sort of work that marks the end of  a long-term project. Thus I encourage the 
author to continue the research program begun with this paper. A number of 
both technical and methodological improvements could make work like this 
more definitive, and I am sure that Edwards plans to pursue them (and many 
others) in future work. More research is very much warranted by the scope and 
importance of the task Edwards sets for himself. 
There is a potentially nontrivial problem of reverse causality associated with 
many of the regressors, especially exchange rate volatility and inflation. After 
all, countries choose their exchange rate regimes, as the theoretical model im- 
plies. Thus an expected change in the nature of  the economy (e.g., in  the 
sources or sizes of shocks or in the government’s preferences) should lead to a 
deliberate change in the exchange rate regime. In such circumstances, using 
historical data would be inappropriate, and using lagged data would provide 
an even less reasonable test of the model. In any case, the standard Lucas cri- 
tique applies to work like this. The exchange rate regime should be expected 
to change the structure of the economy, even if the switch is inadvertent. This 
is yet another reason to treat the historical data carefully in cross-regime esti- 
mation. 
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For all these reasons, I urge Edwards to consider estimation with instrumen- 
tal variables, using his theoretical framework to derive the appropriate first- 
stage regressors. One of the great advantages of having an explicit structural 
model is the ability to derive reasonable instrumental variables. More gener- 
ally, it would also be useful have more clear and well-defined linkages between 
the theory and the data. 
While it is reasonable to use the IMF’s exchange rate regime classifications 
as a starting point, the variable is suspect. For instance, Canada (the country I 
know best) is classified as a floating exchange rate country in this classifica- 
tion, and there is no distinction between the tight Dutch and loose Italian fixes 
in the European Monetary System. I urge Edwards to compare the IMF’s cate- 
gories with actual exchange rate volatility, as a simple robustness check. A 
propos, multinomial logit could be used to handle the “intermediate cases”; 
indeed, this is the way to test the appropriateness of a two-way (as opposed to 
a three-way) regime classification. 
Edwards uses annual data, which is certainly reasonable from many perspec- 
tives (including handling the all-important data availability issue). Neverthe- 
less, this frequency may be inappropriate in this context. Perhaps the right unit 
is “an exchange rate cycle” (just as some researchers believe that data should 
be “phase averaged” for business cycle investigations).  An explicit test of “time 
deformation” would be a useful addition to the literature. This Page Intentionally Left Blank